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The interest in transmission mechanisms has revived since the
EMU was established. Within such a heterogeneous framework, in
fact, it is fundamental to appraise how the one size fits all monetary
policy affects every single member. This paper presents an analysis
in this direction through the estimation of a VAR model using
nation-wide time series. Furthermore, given that data coverage is
now becoming wide enough, it provides a verification of the
impulse-response functions structural stability. This paper provides
evidence of a structural break for Austria and Germany and of
asymmetric effects within the EMU, which are not so big to make
the one size fits all monetary policy a challenging task, however.
[JEL Classification: E52]
Introduction
Within a monetary policy strategy, the knowledge of
transmission mechanisms is a fundamental prequisite because,
through them, the initial monetary shock turns into the desired
objective in terms of real variables. First of all, the timing and the
strength of the shock necessary to achieve that goal are
determinant for a correct formulation of the policy action.
Furthermore, realizing the extent to which the same shock may
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to evaluate the feasibility of a common monetary policy within a
given context. 
Especially with regard to the latter, a rising interest among
researchers developed since the European Monetary Union (EMU)
was established. Many studies
2 emphasize that a one size fits all
monetary policy involves the risk of asymmetric effects within the
EMU countries because of their different financial, goods and
labour markets
3. Moreover, this occurs in a context that lacks an
authority, similar to the European Central Banks System (ECBS)
as regards monetary policy, responsible for the conducting of fiscal
policies.
However, being based on time series at most contemporaneous
with the introduction of the euro, those studies are not exempt from
the Lucas’ critique
4. In other words, the establishment of the EMU
may have represented a structural break in the behaviour of
economic agents, which may have caused a change in the
transmission mechanisms with respect to before. Therefore, in this
paper the effect of monetary policy on real variables will be
estimated on updated time series. Moreover, a test for the hypothesis
of a structural break in the impulse-response functions will be
calculated.
This paper is structured as follows. The first paragraph
provides a survey of the transmission mechanism theories,
distinguishing between money and lending view with regard to the
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have not been weakened by the introduction of the euro in 1999.main conclusions and implications. The second paragraph deals
with the feasibility of a one size fits all monetary policy within the
EMU context. In this sense, an examination of those factors that
literature believes to hinder a homogeneous working of
transmission mechanisms will be provided. Finally, the third
paragraph is aimed at estimating the size of the asymmetric effects
of monetary policy among the EMU countries and at testing the
hypothesis of a structural break in the impulse-response functions.
The main conclusions will be drawn in the fourth paragraph.
1. - Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanisms: The Main
Theories
Monetary policy transmission mechanisms can be defined as
those channels allowing monetary authorities to achieve given
goals in terms of real variables. Therefore, they represent a sort
of link between financial and real sectors, whose existence requires
two necessary conditions. First, monetary authorities must control
the supply of a financial asset for which there is both no perfect
substitute and a demand from the economy. Second, there must
be some form
5 of market imperfections hindering prices to adjust
after a monetary policy action.
Both the money view and the lending view, that is the two
main schools of thought about transmission mechanisms, arise
from these commonly recognized conditions. The essential
difference between them concerns the theoretical approach, as
well as the implications for monetary policy.
1.1 The Money View
What is commonly labelled the money view, is a school of
thought which groups together both keynesian and monetarist
Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanisms, etc. F. SPARGOLI
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5 Broadly speaking, they take the form of nominal rigidities according to the
money view and information asymmetries in financial markets according to the
lending view. authors. In fact, even if they keep their distances from each other,
they both share substantially the same theoretic background.
Namely, they both have a portfolio approach to the demand for
money so much so that Patinkin D. (1965) writes that Friedman’s
theory «can only be seen as a continuation of the keynesian theory
of liquidity preference» and can be considered «an elegant
exposition of the modern portfolio approach to the demand for
money»
6.
Within the analysis of the interaction between monetary and
real variables, the money view assumes that economic agents share
their own wealth among a range of financial and real assets
according to their preferences and their balance constraint.
Furthermore, markets where those assets are traded are believed
to be always cleared, that is able to reach an equilibrium by
themselves through changes in the price level.
As regards the theoretic approach, the fundamental difference
between monetarists and keynesians concerns the substitution
relationships among the assets considered. Keynesians believe they
are stronger between money and financial assets than between
money and real assets, which means emphasizing the liquidity
concept. By contrast, monetarists claim the role of money as an
abode of purchasing power, that is a sort of special asset which
can be equally substituted for both financial and real assets.
In the end, these differences influence the interpretation of
the monetary policy transmission mechanisms and, broadly
speaking, the importance attached to monetary policy. According
to the Keynesian view, monetary policy actions are transmitted to
the real economy through changes in some relative prices, which
cause an alteration in spending decisions. For example, the cost
of capital channel arises from the difference between the rate of
interest and capital marginal efficiency. Moreover, the Tobin’s q
depends on the ratio of the rate of return on shares to capital
marginal efficiency or, alternatively, on the ratio of the companies’
market value to the replacement cost of its equipment.
Furthermore, the exchange rate channel is related to the difference
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6 PATINKIN D. (1969), page 93.between national and foreign rates of interest. Finally, wealth and
income effects depend respectively on the changes in the rate of
interest and the related ones in the asset prices. 
In contrast, the monetarist transmission mechanism works
more directly. The main variable is money, which determines real
effects independently of changes in the rate of interest, once its
own portfolio weight has been altered. In fact, economic agents
tend to restore the original composition through the adjustment
of the portfolio weights of both real and financial assets.
Beyond these differences and the related ones in the role of
monetary policy, both keynesian and monetarist transmission
mechanisms share a common implication, besides a common
theoretic approach. In particular, both the keynesian and monetarist
view involve the social efficiency of monetary policy effects. In other
words, economic agents are believed to react to the new monetary
stance by renouncing to/realizing only those spending decisions
which are less/more proable than the previous ones.
1.2 The Lending View
The  money view of the monetary policy transmission
mechanisms seemed to be not at all convincing, so much so that
several empirical and theoretical doubts have been raised
7. These
criticisms originated dissatisfaction among researchers, which
stimulated a deeper study of transmission mechanisms and
resulted in the birth of the lending view. With respect to the money
view, it repudiates the assumption of a monetary policy
transmission relying only on a portfolio approach. In fact, it
believes economic agents to be not always able to take decisions
according to their related costs and revenues, because their
behaviour is constrained by financial market imperfections, which
are not easy to overcome especially in some circumstances. 
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7 A fundamental paper is surely that of BERNANKE B. - GERTLER M. (1995) who
find evidence of three «puzzles» in the cost of capital channel. Other relevant
papers are those of CHRISTIANO L. - EICHENBAUM M. - EVANS C. (2001); MEESE R. -
ROGOFF K. (1983).The first of them concerns companies’ financing decisions,
which become not at all irrelevant to the real economy, in contrast
to the monetarist and keynesian view
8. In fact, the lending view
claims that the adjustment of both bonds and loans markets
through arbitrages is hindered because a necessary condition does
not hold anymore. In fact, some companies, especially the smaller
ones, are shut out of the capital markets because, on the one hand
their needs are too small compared to the costs required by the
access to those markets and, on the other, they involve severe
information asymmetry problems, which make the role of banking
intermediaries unavoidable. Therefore, in case the offer of bank
loans decreases, such companies would be constrained and,
consequently, forced to a sharp cut in their production, which
strengthens the monetarist and keynesian effects. This is exactly
the essence of the bank lending channel.
The second concerns the extent to which the offer of bank
loans respond to monetary policy shocks, which is believed to be
weaker than the portfolio approach predicts because of constraints
and imperfections affecting financial markets. For example,
capital adequacy requirements prevent an increase in the offer
especially when they are binding. Furthermore, customer care
needs induce banks to preserve loan offer even following a
monetary tightening.
However, Kashyap A. and Stein J. (1993) have a contrary
opinion maintaining that the constraints indicated before, in turn,
involve others in terms of financing needs. To meet them, banks
can realize their bond portfolio or borrow funds directly from
capital markets, which involves, respectively, a decrease in the
liquidity reserves against banking risks and a rising marginal
financing costs schedule because of information asymmetries
between banks and their lenders. Therefore, meeting their total
financing needs may be difficult for banks, which means that the
bank lending channel remains a relevant transmission mechanism. 
The third is about the response of real variables to changes
in the interest rate, which is affected by constraints in economic
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2005
36
8 In particular, this is what the MODIGLIANI F. - MILLER M. (1958) theorem states.agents’ behaviour too. In particular, if they are in the shape of
information asymmetries between banks and firms, such
constraints involve that the loan rate, namely the external finance
premium component, must be inversely related to the firms’
creditworthiness. As regards this, the lending view claims a
determinant role for monetary policy
9, from which a further
transmission mechanism, that is the balance sheet channel,
originates. 
Therefore, the firms’ creditworthiness represents a further way
monetary authorities have to influence investment decisions,
besides the market interest rate. In addition to the cost of capital
channel, the lending view recognizes also that «in terms of a
simple textbook analysis, policy moves both the IS and the LM
curves»
10. In other words, deciding whether to implement or not
an investment project becomes determinant in terms of both
capital marginal efficiency and creditworthiness, by affecting
positively or negatively the expected sales and profits. Among these
and monetary policy, therefore, what emerges is a spiral-shaped
link, which strengthens and amplifies the effects of the initial
policy action winding itself up.
Finally, an implication opposite to that involved by the money
view descends from the previous analysis. In particular, it is that
monetary policy produces asymmetric and socially inefficient
effects, forcing both bank-dependent and not creditworthy firms
to give their investment projects up even if they are profitable.
2. - Monetary Policy Transmission Within the EMU 
Having introduced the main topics about transmission
mechanisms in the previous section, it is now appropriate to focus
the analysis on the European Monetary Union. Indeed, in such a
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9 BERNANKE B. - GERTLER M. - GILCHRIST S. (1998); GREENWALD B. - STIGLITZ J.
(1988) relate this influence to the effects of changes in the interest rate on firms’
cash-flow while KYOTAKI N. - MOORE J. (1997, 1993) to those on the market value
of firms’ collateral.
10 CECCHETTI S. (1995), page 6.new and heterogeneous framework it seems fundamental to assess
both the feasibility and the structural break hypothesis. 
In what follows, therefore, the objective is to achieve both
these goals. First of all, this paragraph deals with the feasibility
of a one size fits all monetary policy within the EMU, which is
related to the heterogeneity of such framework. The next
paragraph, instead, is aimed at reaching both goals through the
estimate of a VAR model, which allows an assessment of the actual
monetary policy response for each EMU country, as well as the
possibility to test the hypothesis of a structural break.
2.1 Transmission Mechanisms Asymmetries: The Background
In order for a one size fits all monetary policy to be feasible
in a given framework, it is necessary to have transmission
mechanisms which produce homogeneous effects within that
framework. In other words, monetary policy shocks must affect
the real economy in a symmetrical way, in order to avoid the threat
of territorial imbalances. Therefore, it is fundamental to recognize
those factors from which the asymmetries of monetary policy
transmission originate, to take them into account when
implementing the policy action and, if necessary, to find suitable
remedies.
With regard to feasibility, the literature
11 agrees on the
determinant role assumed by the framework and, in particular, by
its heterogeneity in terms of some factors. Among them, those
generally recognized are the business cycle, the legal system, the
financial, goods and labour markets. The following paragraphs are
aimed at explaining the role each of them has and possibly at
providing relevant data. 
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11 Among them, see: EHRMANN M. et AL. (2003); ANGELONI I. et AL. (2002); GUISO
L.  et AL. (2000); CECCHETTI S. (2001); RAMASWAMY R. - SLOCK T.  (1998); MIHOV I.
(2001); CLEMENTS B. - KONTOLEMIS Z. - LEVY J. (2002); DORNBUSCH R. - FAVERO C.
- GIAVAZZI F.  (1998).2.1.a The Business Cycle
The business cycle is a factor affecting monetary policy
transmission independently of a single mechanism. In fact, the
problem does not regard the way a given channel works, but the
formulation of the policy action. In particular, when countries of
a same monetary union are not aligned on the same business cycle
stage, monetary authorities have to decide whether favouring
some countries instead of others or weighing the action according
to the conditions of the whole union. However, in both cases the
decision results in asymmetric effects, which are deeper,
respectively, for the less important countries and for those further
from the average. 
Appraising whether a group of countries shares the same
business cycle stage or not is a quite difficult matter. First, it is
necessary that external shocks affecting economic systems are the
same for all countries. In the literature about the EMU
12, the
prevailing opinion with regard to this aspect is a negative one,
which maintains that the correlation of some macroeconomic
series is generally higher among a group of countries (Austria,
Germany, France and Benelux) than among others. Second,
countries must be able to absorb by themselves idiosyncratic
shocks affecting their economic system. Among the necessary
condition indicated by the literature
13, nominal rigidities and
labour mobility seem to be the main weaknesses of the EMU.
However, the negative opinion about the business cycle
alignement of EMU countries is not at all decisive, because the
introduction of the euro is likely to enhance cross-border
transactions and cycle synchronization according to the «optimal
currency area endogeneity hypothesis»
14.
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PEERSMAN G. - SMETS F.  (2001).
13 MUNDELL R. (1961); MCKINNON R. (1963); KENEN P.  (1969); INGRAM J. (1962).
14 MCCALLUM J. (1995); FRANKEL J. - ROSE A. (1998).2.1.b The Financial Markets
Financial markets assume a fundamental role in the monetary
policy transmission because the initial shock goes through them,
at least in the first stage. At the same time, they represent a source
of asymmetric effects, which is related to a range of factors that,
substantially, can be grouped in demand, offer and structural ones. 
Among demand factors, the preferences about financing
decisions as well as some characteristics of financial wealth surely
have a vital significance. To the financing decisions, and in
particular to the importance of bank loans in companies’ financial
structure, both the balance sheet and bank lending channels are
strongly related. Moreover, they influence Tobin’s q, which in fact
requires companies to raise money by issuing shares. By contrast,
wealth and income effects are those channels whose importance
depends on financial wealth particularly in terms of size and
spending propensity. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that the
financing decisions of the economy, in particular the ratio of direct
financing to indirect financing, significantly affects the time lags
the pass through from policy rates to banking rates takes. 
Given the significance of these factors, it is appropriate to
provide data about them. First of all, Table 1 concerns the
financing decisions of the economy, which are separated into
bonds, bank loans and shares. At first sight, what emerges is a
high degree of heterogeneity among the countries, as indicated by
the value of the variance. Direct financing is the largest in the
United Kingdom, both through bonds and shares. Within the EMU
context, the Netherlands ranks first with regard to bond issues,
which are more than twice the EMU average. On the contrary,
Greece, Belgium and Germany show the highest share of bank
loans. With regard to the shares market, Finland and Luxemburg
are those countries where the number of quoted companies per
million of inhabitants is the largest. By contrast, Austria shows
low values of both variables, as well as Italy with regard only to
the number of quoted companies.
Continouing with demand factors, Table 2 reports the size and
the composition of households’ financial wealth. Belgium, France
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wealth is the highest and, at the same time, show, respectively, the
biggest share of long-term bonds, of shares and of long-term debts.
On the contrary, Austria shows the lowest stock of financial
wealth, as well as the smallest share of long-term debts and shares
among the EMU countries. Table 3 concerns the companies’
balance sheets. First of all, what should be noted is the substantial
homogeneity of the EMU context, especially with regard to
leverage. Moreover, Italy emerges as that country in which short-
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TABLE 1
COMPANIES’ FINANCING DECISIONS (2003)
Country Share   Quoted Private
market companies bonds
capitalization (per mln.  to bank
(in % of GDP) of inhabitants) loans
EMU
Austria 19.82 15.43 15.04
Belgium* – – 12.36
Finland 94.74 27.88 30.63
France* – – 60.97
Germany 40.20 10.50 14.27
Greece 53.77 30.18 6.87
Ireland 50.03 16.50 –
Italy 37.47 4.80 32.30
Netherland* – – 82.18
Portugal* – – 60.08
Spain 77.30 79.00 35.85
Euronext 68.28 14.13 –
Mean 55.20 24.80 35.06
Variance 505.37 481.32 568.85
NON EMU
Denmark 49.94 35,93 21.27
Sweden 86.49 31.33 63.64
United Kingdom 125.30 45.32 161.01
Mean 87.24 37.53 81.97
Variance 946.74 33.88 3422.60
Source: National Central Banks, BIS Quarterly Review (2004), International
Federation of Stock Exchanges, Our calculations.
* The Euronext groups the Stock Exchanges of Belgium, France, Netherlands
and Portugal.RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2005
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TABLE 2
HOUSEHOLD’S FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 






Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term wealth
Austria 0.08 10.38 8.66 5.48 42.85 88.10
Belgium 0.28 49.09 32.85 1.66 38.26 207.30
France 3.44 0.24 52.54 2.66 39.60 152.34
Germany 0.06 28.42 15.71 6.26 92.79 152.09
Italy 0.81 29.11 28.73 2.52 12.89 115.70
Spain 0.31 4.00 37.87 3.35 52.42 94.15
Mean 0.83 20.21 29.39 3.66 46.47 134.95
Variance 1.42 289.81 206.19 2.74 572.71 1676.81
NON EMU
Denmark 0.05 12.58 7.86 6.35 94.48 46.00
Source: National Central Banks, Our calculations.
TABLE 3
COMPANIES’ DEBTS IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
(2002)
Country Short-term Short-terms
bonds (%) loans (%) Leverage
EMU
Austria 36.60 24.71 59,00
Belgium 35.50 57.20 58,00
Finland 19.40 ––
France 36.30 17.63 49,00
Germany 44.90 28.32 61,00
Ireland 28.10 ––
Italy 50.30 51.91 62,00
Netherlands 32.50 36.50 64,00
Portugal 62.30 ––
Spain 39.50 31.74 56,00
Mean 38.54 35.43 58.43
Std. deviation 10.76 177.51 4.82
NON EMU
Denmark – 26.14 50,00
Source: CLEMENTS B., KONTOLEMIS Z.G., LEVY J. (2002), National Central Banks,
Our calculations.term financing, both through bank loans and bonds, as well as
leverage has the highest values. By contrast, Austrian firms are
those borrowing less with long-term funds. 
Moving on to offer factors, the economic and financial
conditions of the banking system assume a determinant role
within the monetary policy transmission. First of all, they
influence its creditworthiness and financing needs, which affect
the bank loan response to monetary policy shocks, especially
following a tightening. At the same time, they impact on the time
lags required by the pass-through from policy rates to banking
rates. In this sense, Table 4 reports some balance sheet indeces
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TABLE 4
PROFITABILITY AND EFFICIENCY 
OF SOME EUROPEAN BANKING INDUSTRIES (2001)
Country Interest Operative  Gross  Profits
Margin Costs to Interm.
(in % of (in % of  Margin
total assets) total assets) (in %)
Austria 1.23 1.67 22.43
Belgium 1.00 1.22 29.49
Finland 1.73 1.82 60.43
France 0.96 1.62 4.14
Germany 1.28 1.39 10.61
Grecee* 4.45 4.17 31.12
Ireland 1.53 1.29 37.38
Italy 1.68 1.83 22.61
Luxemburg* 0.65 0.56 44.47
Netherlands 1.47 1.88 22.60
Portugal 1.87 1.52 29.21
Spain 2.45 1.88 25.39
Mean 1.69 1.74 28.32
Variance
NON EMU 0.90 0.67 199.24
Denmark 1.95 1.70 34.91
Sweden 1.24 1.82 38.15
United Kingdom 1.77 1.80 34.70
Mean 1.65 1.77 35.92
Variance 0.09 0.00 2.49
Source: OECD, Bank Profitability 2002, Our calculations.
*Only commercial banks are included.which indicate the profitability and efficiency conditions in the
EMU banking systems. First of all, what should be noted is the
homogeneity in terms of the ratio of both the interest margin to
the total assets and the intermediation margin to the total assets.
By contrast, this homogeneity disappears when considering the
ratio of gross income to the intermediation margin, which has the
highest value for Finland and the lowest for France. The other
EMU countries show values substantially close to the average.
Finally, with regard to structural factors, the banking system
has again a fundamental role within monetary policy
transmission. As well as economic and financial conditions, the
banks’ size represents a relevant factor affecting the adjustment
of the bank loan offer to the monetary stance. In this sense, a
significant role is played also by bank-firm relationship, especially
when they are long-lasting or housebank-shaped. Moreover, these
affect the balance sheet channel too because they are determinant
for the degree of information asymmetries between lender and
borrower. Finally, both these factors influence the time lags the
pass-through from policy rates to banking rates takes, together
with the concentration of the banking system. Table 5 reports
some indicators of the structure of banking systems within the
EMU. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are those
countries where banks’ average size is the largest and, at the same
time, which rank opposite position with regard to the
concentration index. In particular, in the Netherlands there are
few big banks and the banking system appears to be the most
concentrated, in contrast to the United Kingdom. By contrast,
Austria emerges as that country where there are the most
numerous and smallest banks. Finally, the German banking system
shows the lowest concentration index among the EMU countries.
2.1.c The Goods Markets
As well as financial markets, the role of goods markets within
monetary policy transmission comes from demand, offer and
structural factors.
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and, in particular, the share of housing and durables in general.
Being the most sensitive component to changes in interest rates,
they affect the significance of the cost of capital channel. On the
contrary, offer factors concern the sectorial composition of the
productive system, particularly in terms of the share of
investment-intensive sectors.
An analysis of those factors can be drawn from Table 6, which
reports the sectorial contribution to the domestic added value.
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TABLE 5
THE STRUCTURE OF EUROPEAN BANKING SYSTEMS
Country Number Average Number of  Concentration
of bank size* banks (per min.  index**
of inhabit.)
EMU
Austria 927 629 114,44 48
Belgium 112 7.557 10,77 57
Finland 342 454 65,77 78
France 1067 3.632 17,35 40
Germany 2370 2.411 28,73 17
Greece 54 2.865 4,91 71
Ireland 55 7.829 13,75 41
Italy 821 2.383 14,13 25
Luxemburg 189 3.815 472,50 –
Netherlands 84 20.975 5,19 79
Portugal 218 1.306 20,96 76
Spain 281 4.256 6,89 44
Mean 543,33 4842,67 64,62 52,36
Std. deviation  648,78 5360,36 126,74 20,59
NON EMU
Denmark 117 2.277 21,67 17
Sweden 128 2.683 14,22 90
United Kingdom 385 12.899 6,48 28
Mean 210,00 5953,00 14,12 45,00
Variance 123,83 4914,36 6,20 32,14
Source: OECD, Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of Banks (2002),
CECCHETTI S.G. (1999).
* Ratio of total banks’ assets tothe number of banks (Mln. of Euros; 2001).
** Share of the total assets of the largest 5 banks (1999).With regard to demand factors, it is reasonable to think that, when
the sector producing a component sensitive to interest rates has
a significant contribution to the added value, the same component
will be important in the aggregate demand. From the analysis of
table 6, what emerges is that the sectorial composition of the
productive systems is quite homogeneous within the EMU
countries, except for two fundamental industries such as
machinery and building. With regard to the first, Finland and
Germany show a contribution well above the EMU average, while
Greece ranks last. On the contrary, the building industry is
particularly relevant in Spain, Greece and Austria, while Sweden
is the country where it counts less. 
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TABLE 6
INDUSTRIES’ CONTRIBUTION TO THE ADDED VALUE 
AND TRADE OPENNESS (2002)
Country Food Textile Machineries Means of Buildings Trade
transport openness*
EMU
Austria 2.40 0.80 4.70 1.50 7.40 10.9
Belgium 2.60 1.00 2.60 1.60 4.90 26.4
Finland 1.60 0.40 8.40 0.90 5.40 16.8
France 2.60 0.70 – 2.40 4.90 10.6
Germany 2.10 0.50 6.40 3.40 4.50 12.9
Greece 2.50 1.90 0.80 0.70 8,10 –
Italy 2.10 2.60 4.20 1.10 4.90 9.4
Ireland – – – – – 38.5
Luxemburg 1.00 0.70 1.10 0.00 5.90 –
Netherlands 3.20 0.30 2.40 0.70 5.90 23.5
Portugal – – – – – 10.4
Spain – – – – 9.20 7.6
Mean 2.23 0.99 3.83 1.37 6.11 16.7
Variance 0.36 0.52 6.07 0.92 2.27 87.6
NON EMU
Denmark 2.60 0.40 4.10 0.50 5.00 –
Sweden – – - – 4.40 –
United Kingdom 2.20 0.60 3.20 1.80 5.90 –
Mean 2.40 0.50 3.65 1.15 5.10 _
Variance 0.04 0.01 0.20 0.42 0.38 –
Source: OECD, Stan Industrial Database, Our Calculations.
* It refers to the degree of trade openness to non European countries.Among structural factors, finally, it is possible to include trade
openness, which affects the exchange rate channel. Moreover,
factors such as the elasticities of importations, exportations and
domestic prices to changes in exchange rates are relevant too. The
lower these variables are, the weaker the exchange rate channel
is within monetary policy transmission. In this sense, Table 6
reports the trade openness of some European countries to non
European ones, which has the highest values in Ireland and
Belgium while in Italy and Spain the lowest.
2.1.d The Labour Market
Asymmetries of the monetary policy transmission are likely
to depend on the labour market too. This possibility is related to
two kinds of considerations. 
The first does not regard single mechanisms, but it affects one
of the necessary conditions allowing monetary policy to influence
real variables. In particular, it deals with nominal rigidities, which
depend strongly on labour market rigidities in terms of
employment protection legislation. Therefore, the more this
market is regulated, the longer transmission lags are and the
weaker the effects of monetary policy, especially in case of
contractionary shocks.
The second consideration has to do with the bargaining
system of salaries, which influences the expectations channel.
Bruno M. and Sachs J. (1985) believe that the increase in salaries
is easier to contain when bargaining occurs in a centralized
system. By contrast, if the system is based on a plurality of labour
unions, the incentive to claim for higher salaries in order to attract
new members prevails over the awareness of the link between
price expectations and monetary policy, which is instead typical
of the centralized system. 
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Factors related to the legal system affect monetary policy
transmission mainly through those channel indicated by the
lending view. In fact, they determine the incentive that both firms
and banks have to moral hazard behaviours. 
For example, the rigour of law enforcement influences the
riskiness of a bank loan and, consequently, the external finance
premium charged to firms. On the contrary, the role of the
government in the economy, the banking bankruptcy rules and the
deposit insurance schemes are examples of factors affecting the
degree of riskiness involved in financing banks.
With regard to the legal system, Table 7 reports three indicators
for a group of European countries. The first, labelled “Shareholder
rights”, has higher values when shareholders find it less costly and
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TABLE 7
THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Country Shareholders Creditors Law Origin of the
rights rights enforcement legal system
EMU
Austria 2 3 10,00 German
Belgium 0 2 10,00 French
Finland 2 1 10,00 Scandinavian
France 2 0 8,98 French
Germany 1 3 9,23 German
Greece 1 1 6,18 French
Ireland 3 1 7,80 Anglo-Saxon
Italy 0 2 8,33 French
Netherland 2 2 10,00 French
Portugal 2 1 8,68 French
Spain 2 2 7,80 French
NON EMU
Denmark 3 3 10,00 Scandinavian
Sweden 2 2 10,00 Scandinavian
United Kingdom 4 4 8,57 Anglo-Saxon
Source: CECCHETTI S.G. (1999), Table 7.difficult to vote directors out. The second, named “Creditor rights”,
has lower values when creditors experience less difficulty gaining
possession of property that has been used to collateralize a bond
or loan. The third, labelled “Enforcement”, has higher values when
countries are more rigorous in carrying out their laws. Finally, the
last column reports the legal family from which each country’s laws
are derived. With regard to the present analysis, the second and
third indeces are the most relevant. What emerges from Table 7 is
that creditor rights are strongly protected in Finland, Ireland and
Portugal while the enforcement is more aggressive in Austria,
Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands.
2.2 Monetary Policy Transmission within the EMU: Concluding
Remarks
According to the previous analysis, the framework in which
transmission mechanisms are working does not seem to be
homogeneous. Therefore, it should be taken into account that the
centralized European monetary policy is likely to produce
asymmetric effects in terms of both GDP and price level. However,
it is not possible to definitely recognize those countries having the
biggest advantages or disadvantages, but only those countries
where a given transmission mechanism is likely to impact more
strongly. The more these channels are numerous in a given
country, the more it is reasonable to expect higher monetary policy
effects in that country. 
In particular, this is the case of Italy and Germany. In both
countries, companies’ financial structure, which is mainly
composed of bank loans
15, as well as the banking structure, which
is made of small-medium size banks
16, are likely to favour the
bank lending channel.
The relevant shares of short-term financing in companies’
financial structure and government bonds in households’
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15 The high leverage and the small share of direct financing represent a proof
of that (see Table 1 and Table 3).
16 See Table 5.portfolios
17, furthermore, are expected to make the income effect
particularly effective. With regard to Italy, the balance sheet
channel may have a strong impact on firms because of their
financial structure, which has just been analysed, the low value
taken by th “Enforcement” index
18 and given that firms’ size is
generally small. With regard to Germany, the high contribution of
the machinery industry to the added value
19 is likely to make the
cost of capital channel fairly strong.
On the contrary, two mechanisms at most are likely to impact
more deeply in the remaining countries. This is the case of
Belgium, where the stock of financial wealth and the trade
openness, which are among the largest in Europe
20, should favour
the wealth effect and the exchange rate channel. In Finland as well,
two mechanisms are expected to be particularly effective: namely,
they are the Tobin’s q and the cost of capital channel because of
the high share market capitalization and the importance of
machinery and building industries in the composition of the added
value
21. Finally, there are no mechanisms expected to have their
maximum effects within the rest of the EMU countries.
3. - The Transmission Mechanisms Asymmetries: A VAR Estimate
The conclusions drawn from the previous sections will now
be assessed empirically, together with the hypothesis of a
structural break. In this sense, the strategy is to estimate a VAR
model, which is a commonly used technique mainly because it
makes possible to find the response of each variable included in
the system to monetary policy shocks. In particular, the strategy
consists in selecting a guideline paper among the wide VAR
literature, re-estimating the model using updated time series and,
finally, comparing the results through both the graphic analysis
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17 See Table 2 and Table 3.
18 See Table 7.
19 See Table 6.
20 See Table 1 and Table 2.
21 See Table 1 and Table 6.and a Chow test. Among the huge number of papers relying on
VAR models, that of Ramaswamy and Slock (1998) has been
selected mainly because, compatibly with data availability, the
authors analyse all the EMU countries and provide an estimate of
the impulse-response functions for each of them.
3.1 The Approach of Ramaswamy and Slock
Ramaswamy R. and Slock T. (1998) analyse the asymmetries
of monetary policy transmission by estimating and comparing the
impulse-response functions of each European country considered.
In particular, these include a group of EMU countries, that is
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain, as well as others, that is Denmark, the United
Kingdom and Sweden. Impulse-response functions, concerning
only the GDP response, have been calculated through a VAR model
which includes, in order, real GDP, a consumer price index in levels
and a three-months inter-bank interest rate. Finally, the model has
been estimated using quarterly time series covering the period from
1972 to 1995, except for Portugal for which the time series finish
in 1994. The estimated response of real GDP to interest rate shocks
is reported in Graph 1.
When explaining their results, Ramaswamy R. and Slock T.
(1998) emphasize that the full effects of a contractionary monetary
shock on real GDP take roughly twice as long to occur but the
resulting decline is almost twice as deep in one group of countries,
which includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as in the other group, which
includes Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. For
this reason, authors label the first group “core” and the second
“periphery” and they state that «the important question is to what
extent these differences are likely to carry through once the euro
comes into circulation»
22. They believe also that «the task of
conducting monetary policy at the EU-wide level is likely to be a
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GRAPH 1
GDP RESPONSE TO AN INTEREST RATE SHOCK 
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(cont.) GRAF. 1
GDP RESPONSE TO AN INTEREST RATE SHOCK 











































0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Quarters Quarters
Quarters Quarters
Source: RAMASWAMY R. - SLOCK T. (1998).challenging one in the initial years of the monetary union»
23. At
the same time, they rely on financial integration and monetary
policy centralization to cushion those differences. 
3.2 The Re-estimated VAR Model
Once the paper of Ramaswamy and Slock has been
introduced, it is easy to re-estimate their VAR model on the basis
of updated time series in order to assess the depth of asymmetric
effects among the EMU countries again.
Besides using more updated series, which cover the period
1972-2004:2, the VAR model is therefore the same as the previous
one, except for a detail. In particular, this deals with the time lags
of variables, which are three, instead of two, in the case of Austria,
France, Germany and the Netherlands, according to both the
Akaike and Schwartz information criteria and the Ljung-Box Q
test. The re-estimated impulse-response functions of real GDP are
reported in Graph 2 together with those of the price level. To
assess the depth of asymmetric effects, the EMU countries have
been compared in terms of both the full effects and the time lags
they take to occur. 
With regard to the response of GDP, what emerges from Graph
2 and Table 8 is a substantial homogeneity among the EMU
countries, except for Finland where the full effect is more than
threefold the EMU average. On the contrary, in Austria and
Portugal monetary policy do not seem to have a significant impact
on real GDP. Furthermore, the GDP response for Germany and
Austria seems to be quite weak, being roughly half the EMU
average. Finally, close to this value is the GDP response of the rest
of the EMU countries.
Continouing with the GDP response, deeper asymmetries
emerge when considering the time lags that the full effects take
to occur. Beside being that country in which the effect is the
highest, Finland shows also the longest time lag. Moreover, it is
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GRAPH 2
RESPONSES OF REAL GDP AND PRICE LEVEL 
TO AN INTEREST RATE SHOCK (*)
Austria 1972:1 - 2004:2
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Finland 1972:1 - 2004:2
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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(cont.) GRAPH 2
RESPONSES OF REAL GDP AND PRICE LEVEL 
TO AN INTEREST RATE SHOCK
France 1972:1 - 2004:2
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Germany 1972:1 - 2004:2
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Netherland 1972:1 - 2004:2
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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(cont.) GRAPH 2
RESPONSES OF REAL GDP AND PRICE LEVEL 
TO AN INTEREST RATE SHOCK
Portugal 1972:1 - 2004:2
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Spain 1972:1 - 2004:2
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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United Kingdom 1972:1 - 2004:2
Response to One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Sources: Our calculation.also the country in which significant GDP responses occur taking
the shortest lag, together with the Netherlands. After Finland,
France ranks second and, at the same time, it appears to be the
country where significant GDP responses take the longest lag to
occur. On the contrary, in Germany and Italy the time lags related
to the full effects are the shortest within EMU while those related
to significant GDP responses are close to the EMU average. Finally,
the full effects take a lag close to the EMU average to occur in
the rest of the EMU countries.
With regard to the price level responses, what emerges is a
higher heterogeneity. First of all, it should be noted that Germany
and the Netherlands are the only EMU countries where the price
level has a significant reduction while, at most, it does not
diminish significantly in other countries. Moreover, there is
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TABLE 8
FULL EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY 
ON GDP AND PRICE LEVEL
Country Real GDP Price level
Maximum Time Maximum Maximum Lag of  Lag of




Austria –0.2 10.5 0 0 – –
Belgium –0.45 11.5 0 0 – –
Finland –1.7 15 0 0 – –
France –0.55 14.5 0.3 0 10 –
Germany –0.27 6 0 –0.08 – 17
Italy –0.45 9 0.3 0 6.5 –
Netherland –0.5 12.5 0.2 –0.25 5 24
Portugal 0 – 0 0 – –
Spain 0 – 0 0 – –
Mean –0.463 11.64 0.267 –0.165 7.167 20,5
Variance 0.23 7.62 0.016 –0.006 4.389 12.25
NON EMU
Denmark –0.5 7,5 0 –0.3 – 23
Sweden –1.5 4 0.55 0 4 –
United Kingdom –1 15 1 0 10.5 –
Source: Our calculation.evidence of a significant price increase in France, Italy and the
Netherlands, which is generally
24 known as «price puzzle» in the
literature. However, this is believed to depend on misspecification
problems of the model and, in particular, on the omission of a
relevant variable to monetary policy. In fact, in this case changes
in the interest rates related to the omitted variables are
erroneously considered as monetary policy shocks, so that the
price increase does not represent the real response to a policy
action but an endogenous reaction within the VAR model. An
important strand of literature, starting from Sims (1992),
maintains that the “price puzzle” can be solved including a
“leading indicator” of the price level in the model, such as
commodity prices. By contrast, Giordani (2004) believes that a
“price puzzle” emerges whenever a measure of the output gap is
omitted. In fact, this variable reflects not only demand shocks, but
also technology ones which affect real GDP too.
Again with regard to the price level response, it should be
noted that the full reduction seems to be stronger, but also more
delayed, in the Netherlands than in Germany. In those countries
where there is evidence of a “price puzzle”, on the contrary, the
full effects are substantially the same as well as the time lags they
take to occur, except for France where they are longer. Finally,
there are no significant price level reductions in the rest of the
countries.
3.3 The Birth of EMU: Was there a Structural Break?
By re-estimating the VAR model on updated time series it is
also possible to assess whether or not the adoption of the Euro
caused a structural break in the impulse-response functions of the
EMU countries. The strategy used to investigate this matter is
twofold. First, a graphic comparison between the estimates of
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24 On the contrary, BARTH M.J. - RAMEY V.A. (2001) believe that the evidence
of a price increase following a monetary tightening is not puzzling once it is
assumed that monetary authorities react to supply-side shocks and not only to
demand shocks.Ramaswamy and Slock and the new ones will be carried out.
Second, a Chow test will be calculated in order to appraise the
statistical significance of the differences previously found.
With regard to the first strategy (Table 9), what emerges is
that the evidence of a “core” and a “periphery” group seems to be
less strong. As regards the first group, the exceptions are Finland
and the United Kingdom, which still show the highest and the
most delayed responses. The Netherlands too remains in the “core”
group showing a substantially unchanged response, even if the
time lags have lightly diminished. As regards the “periphery”
group, Portugal and Spain confirm their position, being their
impulse-response functions not significantly different from zero.
A further confirmation in this sense comes from Table 9, which
shows that both countries keep their previous ranking.

















































RANKING OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ACCORDING 
TO THE GDP RESPONSE
RAMASWAMY R. - SLOCK T. (1998) Updated estimations
Full Time lag Full Time lag
effect* of the  effect of the 
full effect** full effect
Source: Our calculations, RAMASWAMY R. - SLOCK T. (1998).
* In absolute values and in increasing order.
** In increasing order.From Table 9, what emerges is also the case of Germany,
which had a strong reduction both in the full effect and in the
time lags it takes to occur. The same considerations can be done
for Austria, in particular as regards time lags. On the contrary,
Italy kept the full effect substantially unchanged but it experienced
an increase in the time lags necessary for it to occur. By contrast,
Sweden did not show changes in the time lags but it had an
increase in the intensity of the monetary policy effect.
Finally, what comes out from the previous analysis is that
Germany and Austria are those countries which experienced
substantial changes in the impulse-response functions more than
the others. In the next paragraph, this conclusion will be
compared to those drawn from the Chow test.
3.4 The Chow Test
Assessing the structural stability of a VAR model through the
Chow test is more complicated than in the univariate case, because
it involves comparing a system of equations, not just a single one,
on the basis of two different sub-samples. In fact, the point is that
the possible acceptance of the null hypothesis for every single
equation does not guarantee the structural stability of the whole
model. The way out is to resort to a likelyhood ratio test, given
by the following formula:






l) is the covariance matrix determinant of the
unconstrained model, det(∑
v) is that of the constrained model
25
and n is the number of observations. The distribution of the test
is a χ
2with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters
to be annulled.
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25 The unconstrained model is the VAR which has just been estimated. The
constrained one, instead, is a model to which two more variables have been added,
namely a dummy variable (taking value 1 for all the observations following the
structural break and 0 for the remaining ones) and an other one obtained by
multiplying the regressors of the unconstrained model by that dummy.Besides these technical considerations, the estimate of a Chow
test requires the identification of a supposed date of break. To the
present analysis, it is quite difficult to define the date of birth of
the Euro because the adoption of the common currency required
a long process of macroeconomic convergence. Therefore, the way
out has been to estimate the Chow test referring to an intermediate
date between 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, and
2002, when the Euro actually came into circulation. In particular,
the 1997:2 was chosen as supposed date of break.
Table 10 shows the results. The conclusions drawn from the
graphic comparison seem to be confirmed for Austria and
Germany, for which in fact the hypothesis of a structural break is
accepted. Moreover, the null hypothesis is refused also for Sweden
and Portugal, in contrast with the result found from the previous
analysis as regards the latter. However, it should be specified that
the scanty number of available observations could have affected
the results. On the contrary, the result for Sweden seems to be in
line with the intensification of the real GDP response, for which
this country is placed two positions higher in the ranking with
respect to the estimates of Ramaswamy and Slock.
Subsequently, the hypothesis of structural break has been
tested considering two more dates of break, in order to check the
robustness of the results. In particular, the time series have been
split at the third quarter of 1996 and first quarter of 1998.
Consistent with the previous results, the Chow test refuses the null
hypothesis for Austria, Germany and Sweden, for which it is
reasonable to state that the impulse-response functions had a
break caused by the adoption of the Euro. With regard to Portugal,
on the contrary, the null is refused again at the first quarter of
1998 but not at the third quarter of 1996. However, it should be
specified that the p-value is close to 5% and, therefore, the result
is not at all decisive also because the null is accepted at the other
dates. The hypothesis of a structural break is definitely refused
for the rest of the countries. Therefore, consistent with the graphic
comparison are the results found for Finland and the United
Kingdom, which were believed to remain in the “core” group.
Finally, it is possible to state that the adoption of the Euro
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2005












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.caused a structural break in the impulse-response functions of
Austria, Germany and Sweden
26.
4. - Concluding Remarks
This paper dealt with monetary policy transmission
mechanisms, a topic to which researchers showed a rising interest
contemporaneously with the process of monetary unification in
Europe. In such a new and heterogeneous framework, in fact,
understanding how monetary policy is transmitted to real variables
becomes a fundamental prequisite. This occurs mainly because of
doubts about the feasibility of a one size fits all monetary policy
in such a context, which therefore needs to be assessed, and
because the adoption of the Euro was likely to cause a structural
break in the behaviour of economic agents. Therefore, this paper
was aimed at investigating both these matters, once a theoretical
survey of transmission mechanisms had been introduced.
With regard to feasibility, the main conclusions drawn from
the first section were that the transmission mechanisms
recognized by the lending view, opposite to those identified by the
money view, involve asymmetric effects of monetary policy. On the
contrary, this implication emerged from the second section
independently of the theoretic background of the transmission
mechanisms. In fact, it was related to the heterogeneity of the
context where monetary authorities operate, in terms of the
business cycle, the legal system, the financial, goods and labour
markets. Therefore, an analysis of these factors within the EMU
was carried out in order to assess the feasibility of a EMU-wide
level monetary policy. However, the results did not make possible
to identify those countries obtaining the greatest advantages or
disadvantages, but only to recognize those where transmission
mechanisms were expected to produce their maximum effect.
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26 With regard to Sweden, however, it must be stressed that the evidence of a
structural break, as well as the increase in the intensity of monetary policy effects
on GDP (See par. 3.3), can hardly be interpreted as a consequence of the ECB’
policy because Sweden did not join the EMU.Therefore, it was necessary to estimate a VAR model in order
to find the response of both real GDP and price level to monetary
policy shocks for each EMU country, as well as for Sweden,
Denmark and the United Kingdom for a comparison. Being rarely
significant and showing evidence of the “price puzzle”, the price
responses did not seem to be suitable for a comparison, which in
fact was carried out on the basis of the real GDP response. As
expected, there is evidence of asymmetries in terms of both the
full effect and, especially, the time lag they take to occur. Finland
emerges as the country where monetary policy produces the
highest effect which, at the same time, takes the longest lag to
occur. On the contrary, the real GDP response to an interest rate
shock is not significant in Spain and Portugal. Finally, Belgium
and Italy show the responses closest to the EMU average. 
At this point, it is possible to appraise the consistency of the
results found in Sections 2 with those in Section 3. What emerges
is that the expectations are substantially confirmed, except for
Germany, the Netherlands and France. In fact, Finland, Italy and
Belgium, that is those countries where at least two channels were
likely to produce their maximum effect, show real GDP responses
close to, or higher than, the EMU average. On the contrary,
Germany has one of the weakest responses even if there were three
channels expected to impact more strongly. By contrast, the The
Netherlands and France show real GDP responses close to the EMU
average although there were no channels likely to produce their
maximum effect. As expected, the responses found for Austria,
Portugal and Spain are the weakest within the EMU countries.
With regard to the hypothesis of structural break, the strategy
was to carry out a graphic comparison between the estimates of
Ramaswamy and Slock and the updated ones, as well as to
calculate a Chow test for the impulse-response functions. In both
cases, there is evidence of a structural break for Austria and,
surprisingly, for Sweden and Germany. In fact, Alesina and Grilli
(1993) believed that it was necessary to allow this country
favourable treatment in order to induce it to join the EMU
27.
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27 This because the bargaining power Germany had, being the country with
the lowest inflation rate, made it indifferent to whether joining the EMU or not.Moreover, Rotondi Z. and Vaciago G. (2003) identify this
favourable treatment with the choice of ECB to follow the
Bundesbank reaction function
28. With regard to Sweden, instead,
the result seems puzzling because the exercise of monetary policy
is still on the responsibility of national authorities. It would be
worth, therefore, to analyse the reasons of the structural breaks
found for those two countries.
Referring to the conclusions drawn by Ramaswamy R. and
Slock T. (1998), finally, it is possible to state that the one size fits
all monetary policy still produces asymmetric effects, which are
not so deep as to make the task of ECB a challenging one, however.
In fact, that of asymmetries in the monetary policy transmission
is a problem that National Central Banks had to cope with before
the EMU was established. Moreover, the process of European
integration is likely to cushion those factors causing asymmetric
effects.
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28 Authors find that the interest rates estimated according to ECB reaction
function are closer to the actual ones when considering German data instead of
EMU ones. Moreover, they find no evidence of structural break in the Bundesbank
reaction function.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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